Dr. Moeed W. Yusuf
Former National Security Adviser of Pakistan
—Greg Myre, NPR, March 10, 2019
Pakistan's Long Support For Militants Puts The Country In A Bind
Moeed Yusuf, an analyst at the U.S. Institute of Peace, recently questioned Pakistan's ambassador about the country's support of militants.
—Same crises, more meddlers, The Indian Express, June 7, 2018
I have spent the last five years studying India-Pakistan crises — Kargil, the 2001-2002 military standoff, and the Mumbai crisis being the most prominent ones. My conclusions, presented in my book, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments, are unequivocal: In the two decades since the nuclear tests, the two sides became far more — and not less — dependent on the US and other third-party states to bail them out of crises. Ironically, this wasn’t because they buckled under pressure. Rather, and this is the most intriguing part, they willingly let outsiders play broker.
—Another nuclear crisis in the making? Great power competition and the risk of war in South Asia, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 5, 2018
In May 1998, India and, later, Pakistan conducted multiple nuclear tests to become the first pair to go nuclear in the post-Cold War era. Two decades on, these South Asian rivals remain locked in a deeply antagonistic relationship that constantly threatens to boil over.
—Moeed Yusuf's guest post on crisis management in South Asia, Arms Control Wonk, May 31, 2018
The global nuclear debate in recent months has focused on North Korea and Iran. Little has been said about South Asia, another nuclear theater, that has been heating up for some time. This also happens to be a region where U.S. mediation has previously been central to lowering the risk of war. But what of the future?
—Pakistan's nuclear evolution: A Primer, Herald, Pakistan, May 28, 2018
While the concept of nuclear deterrence has been stretched in various directions over the years, in its essence, it is about preventing a major war. As long as the rivals in question have a nuclear capability that cannot be completely destroyed by the other side before one has a chance to use it – a ‘survivable’ arsenal in nuclear lingo – the threat of nuclear retaliation is supposed to hold back adversaries from harming each other in any serious way.